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Consciousness: 
Modeling the Mystery
Introduction
Confusions	about	consciousness	are	numerous	and	range	from	disputes	about	
how	 to	define	 it1	 to	 the	 type	of	questions	 that	 seem	 to	be	 irresolvable	 (the	
‘hard’	 problem	 of	 consciousness).	 The	 elusiveness	 of	 consciousness,	 once	
the	reason	for	science	to	turn	away	from	the	subject,	nowadays	has	become	
an	intellectual	challenge	that	motivates	multidisciplinary	research,	including	
empirical	research.	Indeed,	consciousness	has	become	the	central	problem	in	
philosophy	of	mind,	and	receives	ever-increasing	attention	from	the	neuro-	
and	cognitive	sciences.
The	study	or	science	of	consciousness2	is	a	field	in	which	views	diverge.	The	
resulting	theories	testify	to	the	extent	to	which	the	phenomenon	is	complex	
and	multifaceted.	There	 is	probably	no	branch	of	philosophy	 that	 is	 richer	
with	conflicting	views	than	the	philosophy	of	mind,	and	especially	in	the	area	
of	consciousness.	A	layman	may	wonder	as	to	why	authors	invest	so	much	en-
ergy	to	convincingly	show	that	consciousness	exists	(e.g.	Searle,	1997),	while	
at	the	same	time	equal	effort	is	invested	to	doubt	its	existence	(e.g.	Dennett,	
1991),	make	it	supervenient,	epiphenomenal,	or	to	eliminate	it	altogether	(e.g.	
Rorty,	1979;	Churchland,	1989).
There	 is	one	 thing,	however,	about	which	authors	agree,	namely	 that	 there	
is	no	single	definition	of	consciousness,	whilst	disagreeing	as	 to	what	 it	 is	
not.3	There	also	seems	to	be	agreement	about	consciousness	as	the	essential	
dimension	of	the	mental,	but	disagreements	emerge	as	to	its	nature	and	func-
tion.	Some	warn	 that	 it	 is	unjustified	 to	 talk	about	 the	 term	in	 the	singular	
because	we	actually	deal	with	a	number	of	its	different	forms	(Block,	1995).	
They	provide	scientific	evidence	for	the	existence	of	“microconsciousnesses”	
(Zeki,	2003).	One	or	many,	the	problem	of	accessibility	of	inner	conscious	
states	stubbornly	remains	as	one	of	the	fundamental	issues	that	persists	as	a	
sort	of	paradox:	why	is	that	the	conscious	states	which	we	experience	as	the	
most	intimate	part	of	our	‘self’	(itches,	tickles,	pains,	perceptions,	feelings,	
and	thoughts),	and	to	which	an	exclusive	status	of	privacy	is	granted,	turn	out	
to	be	theoretically	elusive	and	secreted?
The	dubious	situation	that	all	the	researchers	meet	is	that	something	as	close	
and	directly	experienced	as	conscious	processes	appears	to	be	difficult,	if	not	
impossible,	to	represent	and	explain.	In	spite	of	the	advancement	of	modern	
1
The	very	object	of	explanation	remains	unde-
fined,	and	the	question	arises	as	to	what	is	that	
that	has	to	be	explained.		
2
See,	for	instance,	Velmans	(1996).
3
While,	for	instance,	Searle	(1994)	warns	that	
consciousness	 should	 not	 be	 confused	 with	
awareness	 and	 knowledge,	 many	 take	 them	
as	synonimous.
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science,	and	especially	huge	progress	in	neuroscience	and	brain	research,	as	
well	as	cognitive	and	computer	science,	consciousness	still	resists	all	efforts	
to	make	it	explainable.4	This	gave	birth	to	the	frequent	syntagm	“mystery	of	
the	 mind”	 (i.e.	 Penfield,	 1975;	 Searle,	 1997,	 McGinn,	 1999).	 “Conscious-
ness	has	been	seen	as	both	a	mystery	and	a	source	of	mystery”	–	so	states	the	
opening	sentence	of	Gerald	Edelman	and	Giulio	Tononi’s	book	(2000).	Even	
David	Chalmers’	seminal	work	(1996)	cannot	escape	the	cliché	and	states	at	
the	very	outset:	“Consciousness	is	the	biggest	mystery”	(vi),	and	also:	“Con-
scious	experience	is	at	once	the	most	familiar	thing	in	the	world	and	the	most	
mysterious”	(3).	Colin	McGinn	confirms	the	general	feeling	that	we	are	still	
very	far	from	deciphering	the	riddle,	saying	that	“	(…)	consciousness	is	in-
deed	a	deep	mystery,	a	phenomenon	of	nature	on	which	we	have	virtually	
no	theoretical	grip.	The	reason	for	this	mystery,	I	maintain,	is	that	our	intel-
ligence	is	wrongly	designed	for	understanding	consciousness.	Some	aspects	
of	nature	are	suited	to	our	mode	of	intelligence,	and	science	is	the	result;	but	
others	are	not	of	the	right	form	for	our	intelligence	to	get	its	teeth	into,	and	
then	 mystery	 is	 the	 result.”	 (1999:	 xi)	 Still,	 not	 everyone	 share	 McGinn’s	
pessimistic	view	that	we	will	never	be	in	a	position	to	fully	understand	the	
nature	of	consciousness;	philosophers	of	the	other	camp	believe	that	it	is	just	
a	matter	of	time	when	the	amount	and	complexity	of	knowledge	of	our	neural	
system	will	be	sufficient	to	provide	us	with	the	full	and	final	insight	into	what	
currently	seems	unconceivable.	
What	is	so	mysterious	about	that	which	seems	to	constitute	us	in	an	authentic	
way	and	be	an	essential	part	of	our	‘self’?	First	of	all,	mysterious	is	the	fact	
that something	physical	can	produce	the	psychical,	and	particularly	how	and	
why it	does	so.	We	still	do	not	know	how	the	matter	makes	mental	states	pos-
sible,	how	neural	dynamics	give	rise	to	subjective	feels	or,	simply,	how	the	
brain	causes	consciousness.	Or,	as	McGinn	puts	it	in	the	form	of	a	rhetoric	
question:	”How	can	technicolor	phenomenology	arise	from	the	sloggy	gray	
matter	of	brains?”	(1989:	349)	The	question	remains	unanswered	by	both	sci-
ences	dealing	with	neurobiological	basis	of	life	and	with	information	process-
ing,	because	the	methods	that	proved	successful	in	the	long	history	of	scien-
tific	 advance	 fail	 to	do	 justice	 to	 the	 richness	of	 conscious	 (“technicolor”)	
experience.	Thus	what	works	for	water	(scientific	represented	by	the	chemi-
cal	formula	of	H2O)	and	lightening	(described	in	terms	of	electric	discharge)	
does	not	work	 for	conscious	states.	That	 is	why	reductive models	 are	con-
vincing	to	an	ever	fewer	number	of	philosophers.	However,	the	irreducibility	
of	consciousness	makes	 the	room	for	 the	“hard”	problem	of	consciousness	
(Chalmers,	1995)	that	is	formulated	in	such	a	way	to	account	for	the	status	
of	experience	and	the	nature	of	subjectivity,	which	turns	out	to	be	one	of	the	
central	questions	of	the	theory	of	consciousness.
Subjectivity,	 that	 irreducible	 basis	 of	 conscious	 life,	 is	 the	 most	 important	
feature	of	consciousness;	other	characteristic	traits	are	unity	(also	called	the	
‘binding	problem’:	all	 the	different	elements	within	 the	conscious	field	are	
experienced	in	a	holistic	mode),	intentionality	(though	not	all	conscious	states	
are	intentional,	most	of	them	are	directed	towards	objects	and	events	in	the	
world),	transparency	(our	experience	enables	us	to	have	direct	contact	with	
the	world,	though	we	are	not	conscious	of	it5),	privileged access	(subjectiv-
ity	is	always	individually	experienced,	and	there	is	no	external	access	to	its	
privacy),	perspectivity	(our	‘internal’	world	can	be	approached	from	either	the	
introspective	or	self-reflexive	‘first-person’	perspective	or	 from	a	scientific	
‘third-person’	perspective),	familiarity	(a	capacity	of	the	conscious	‘self’	to	
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assemble	and	retain	past	experiences,	and	make	them	function	as	a	categorical	
organ	of	re-cognition),	etc.
Since	 many	 aspects	 of	 consciousness	 cannot	 be	 tested	 in	 an	 experimen-
tal	manner,	philosophers	have	devised	theoretical	means	and	a	manifold	of	
thought-experiments	to	cope	with	the	intriguing	subject-matter.	For	instance,	
they	invite	us	to	imagine	a	creature	–	a	zombie	–	morphologically	and	struc-
turally	just	like	us,	but	without	the	psychic	‘inner	world’,	that	is,	devoid	of	
consciousness.	 For	 those	 who	 deny	 consciousness	 (and	 amongst	 them	 we	
can	count	all	anti-mentalists),	we	are	in	fact	all	zombies.	If	such	an	uncon-
scious	zombie	is	logically	possible,	then	it	follows	that	consciousness	is	not	
an	immediate	product	of	functional	organization	or	behavior,	or	simply	that	
material	basis	is	not	enough	for	it	to	emerge.	This	poses	a	serious	threat	to	
physicalism.	
In	another	though-experiment,	but	with	similar	intention,	Frank	Jackson	(1982)	
requires	from	us	to	imagine	the	situation	in	which	Mary,	who	was	an	expert	in	
colors,	but	herself	never	experienced	anything	like	that	because	she	was	im-
prisoned	in	a	black	and	white	room,	suddenly	gets	exposed	to	the	chromatic	
world	as	we	know	it.	The	relevant	philosophical	question	that	the	“knowledge	
argument”	raises	is	the	following:	Did	Mary,	upon	encountering	the	colored	
world	for	the	first	time,	experience	anything	new	(not	a	new	or	another	fact,	
but	something	qualitatively	different)?	The	consequence	of	the	‘yes’	answer	
is	that	knowledge	of	physical	facts	(which,	in	this	case,	Mary	has	of	colors)	
cannot	account	for	the	experiential	know-how	that	proves	to	be	irreducible.	
Analogous	 to	 the	zombie	story,	 the	ultimate	conclusion	 is	 that	physicalism	
fails	as	a	theory	of	consciousness	(Crane,	2001).	Both	thought-experiments	
fuel	the	explanatory gap argument	according	to	which	consciousness	remains	
out	the	reach	of	physicalist	explanation.
What	zombie	does	not	know,	and	Mary	gets	to	learn,	and	all	of	us	naturally	
experience,	is	the	“what	it	is	like	to	be”	(Nagel,	1988)	in	a	certain	conscious	
state	or	“how	it	feels”	to	be	in	it.	Such	an	irreplaceable,	qualitative	state	may	
be	the	blueness	of	the	sea,	the	sound	of	glasses	that	clink,	the	specific	taste	
of	red	wine,	the	feeling	of	anger.	In	order	to	contrast	it	to	measurable	‘quan-
tum’,	the	word	‘quale’	(pl.	qualia)	has	been	coined	to	account	for	the	specific	
subjective	feel	that	is	individually	colored	in	a	way	that	is	not	accessible	to	
the	external	views	of	other	persons.	However,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	our	
own	experiences	are	transparent	to	us	in	a	direct	and	completely	unmediated	
fashion.	True,	the	conscious	mission	is	not	as	impossible	as	in	the	case	of	a	
bat	(Velmans,	1994),	yet	it	is	by	no	means	easily	accessible,	accountable	or	
reportable.	
Based	on	the	dual	nature	of	consciousness	(the	qualitatively	subjective	and	
the	empirically	quantifiable),	 two	opposed	strategies	have	been	developed:	
phenomenological –	to	account	for	phenomena	as	they	appear	in	conscious-
ness,	and	cognitivist	–	to	provide	a	scientific	insight	into	the	neurobiological	
basis	of	cognition	or	computational	models	of	the	mental	seen	as	information	
processing.	Yet	attempts	to	bridge	the	two	seemingly	disparate	domains	make	
themselves	pronounced	(a	significant	input	in	that	direction	provided	Hubert	
Dreyfus,	and	in	his	own	way	Francisco	Varela,	and	in	the	more	recent	times	
Shaun	Gallagher,	Evan	Thompson,	Dan	Zahavi,	etc.).	
4
In	spite	of	Dennett’s	ambitiouly	named	book	
(1991).
5
See,	for	instance,	Metzinger	(1995;	Introduc-
tion).
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Old	questions	mostly	remain	unanswered	and	new	ones	emerge	and	make	the	
riddle	more	difficult	to	unfold:	At	what	point	in	our	phylogeny	do	we	become	
conscious?	 Can	 we	 attribute	 consciousness	 to	 animals	 other	 than	 humans?	
Can	we	put	the	contents	of	consciousness	into	words?	How	can	we	improve	
our	 introspective	awareness	or	self-consciousness?	 Is	 subjectivity	merely	a	
byproduct	of	sensory	information	reaching	the	brain?	Is	pain	information	in	
the	brain	or	bodily	feeling?	What	are	the	possibilities	of	monitoring	own	in-
ternal	processes	when	science,	thus	far,	has	not	been	able	to	identify	in	our	
central	neural	system	anything	like	a	‘seat	of	consciousness’?	Does	self-con-
sciousness	rely	on	the	conceptual	or	is	the	nature	of	the	process	basically	non-
conceptual?	How	can	we	explain	consciousness	in	light	of	the	fact	that	most	
of	our	mental	activity	is	unconscious?	Can	matter	other	than	the	biological	
(i.e.	silicon)	ever	have	experiences	so	that	‘intelligent	machines’	can	become	
conscious?	In	what	sense	are	we	also	machine-like	or	zombie-like?	Is	deter-
minism	the	reason	why	we	fear	materialist	interpretations?	How	should	the	
new	science	of	consciousness	look	like?	What	sort	of	knowledge,	after	all,	is	
needed	to	decipher	the	mystery	of	consciousness?
*	*	*
This	 collection	of	 essays	 is	meant	 to	provide	 samples	 from	different	 areas	
of	the	field,	and	therewith	give	readers	a	flavor	of	the	kinds	of	interests	and	
questions	that	are	characteristic	of	it,	as	well	as	a	sense	of	the	diversity	within	
the	thematic	spectrum	of	the	consciousness	debate.	It	thus	does	not	favor	any	
option,	but	deliberately	leaves	the	scope	open	to	multiple	strategies.	On	the	
one	side	a	perspective	is	created	that	affirms	the	corporeal	dimension	of	con-
sciousness	as	rooted	in	the	natural	history	(Maxine Sheets-Johnstone);	on	the	
other	side,	there	is	an	attempt	to	explore	the	“hard	problem”	in	autonomous	
robots,	whose	capacity	to	cognize	and	develop	conscious	awareness	 is	dis-
cussed	(Bruce MacLennan),	or	to	test	Zombies	in	order	to	show	that	the	phe-
nomenal	is	not	reducible	to	the	ontology	of	physics	(Sabine Windmann),	or	to	
explore	possibilities	of	machine	consciousness	(Igor Aleksander).	Authors	in	
this	volume	examine	the	modes	of	co-evolution	of	matter	and	consciousness	
(Max Velmans),	 challenge	 a	 dualistic	 view	 of	 sensory	 consciousness	 (Wil-
liam S. Robinson),	seek	modes	of	neuroscientific	representation	of	experience	
(Julian Kiverstein),	and	question	how	justified	it	is	to	position	consciousness	
on	top	of	the	“natural	hierarchy”	associated	with	‘higher’	cognitive	mecha-
nisms	 (Hans Werner Ingensiep),	 and	 whether	 self-determination	 and	 free-
dom	are	compatible	 (Michael Pauen).	A	subtle	problem	of	self-monitoring	
of	conscious	states	is	addressed	(Uriah Kriegel),	as	is	also	the	possibility	of	
integrating	 phenomenology	 of	 consciousness	 and	 a	 cognitive	 neuroscience	
of	consciousness	 (Eduard Marbach).	The	view	 is	presented	 that	 subjective	
perspective	cannot	be	extrapolated	from	the	shared	experience	of	the	world,	
which	 is	 also	 the	 basis	 for	 scientific	 descriptions	 (Matthew Ratcliffe).	The	
currently	widespread	notion	that	the	subjectivist	(first-person)	and	scientific	
(third-person)	perspectives	are	not	only	seen	as	contrasting	but	also	as	exclu-
sive,	is	questioned	as	problematic	(Zdravko Radman).
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